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Abstract
This paper deals with the information acquisition in a common value auction
model. In the simple case of two bidders, we reach the conclusion that the
conventionally known statement that the auctioneer’s revenue is higher in the
case of English auction than in the second price auction at equilibrium is not
quite true, but the contrary is correct.
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1 Introduction
Compte and Jehiel(2007) has drawn a conclusion that the auctioneer’s revenue is
higher in English auction(Open ascending auction) than in the second price auction
when there exists an uninformed bidder. This was a discovery of a new condition that
can strengthen the argument of Milgrom and Weber(1982). In addition, an analysis
that the above statement still holds when there is negative externality resulted in the
prevalence of the thought that dynamic-form auction rules are superior to static-form
auction rules, and many dynamic auction rules are devised for practical purposes.
This paper insists that the above statement should be reconsidered. Milgrom ar-
gues when the information of the value of the auction item is known to the bidders,
the expected revenue under English auction rule is superior to the expected revenue
under the second price auction rule, which is equivalent to the denial of the revenue
equivalence in private value model. Compte argues such bidders earn higher revenue
than under the static rule through ’wait and see strategy’ and the acquisition of infor-
mation in the private value model when there exists a bidder who is unaware of the
value of the auction item. Our analysis starts from the question about the condition
of increasing the revenue in the two models, that is, considering the combined model
of affiliation and information acquisition.1 It is interesting to note that the second
price auction revenue can be higher under the situation where the two conditions are
combined. The intuition behind this is the following. In English auction, the bidders
with no information have less incentives to acquire information because they can make
inferences by observing the behaviors of other bidders.
The answer to the question whether the model of this paper possesses practical
meaning is given in the following. Over the last 10 years, the problems regarding the
1But it is acknowledged that on of the shortcomings of this analysis is the usage of common value
model which is an specific interdependent value model.
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information acquisition of the values of auction items have been studied. It is a try to
better reflect the reality with criticism and improvements on the previous studies which
assumed exogenously given information, considering the fact that information are not
naturally given but should be acquired with cost. This paper can be understood in the
same context. Especially the significance of the information acquisition in the common
value model, not in the private value model, can be found in the distinct relationship
among the pieces of information. In the private value model, the channel through
which the information acquisition influences other bidders is as simple as the change
of bidding price of the bidder who acquired the information whereas in the common
value model, it influences through a more complicated channel and the bidders are put
in a game situation. The details will be presented in the main body of this paper.
1.1 Related literature
Matthews (1984) studied information acquisition and discussed about a symmetric
equilibrium in a first price auction. The first price auction defined as each bidder
shared a common, yet unknown value. He also analyzed if the value of the winning bid
converged to the true value of the object once the pool of bidders became larger.
Hausch and Li (1993) developed a common-value model that very similar with the
model that made by Lee. The objective had two potential valuations that both of them
could be rejected by a signal with a cost. The accuracy of the signal was positively
related to the amount of cost spent on it. The authors characterized a symmetric
equilibrium and the analysis that could be later extended to the private-value case by
Hausch and Li. (1993a)
Persico (2000) conducted research on the incentive to acquire information and the
value of information through introducing the notion of risk-sensitivity. He found that
the value of information played a more critical role in decision problems where bidders
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were more risk-sensitive. The comparison between incentives for information acqui-
sition in the first-price and second-price auctions in the affiliated value setting was
established by him.
Bergemann and Valimaki (2002) researched about a general interdependent value
context and the impact of ex-post efficiency on the ex -ante incentives for information
acquisition.
Rezende(2005) analyzed the moment that bidders could have more information
during the bidding process. The heterogeneity in the prior information, the information
acquisition cost, and the existence of equilibrium should be allowed in the process. He
figured that the dynamic auctions generated more revenue than one-shot auctions for
many bidders.
Compte and Jehiel (2007) competition appears strong ex ante, it may turn out to




There are two bidders(i = 1, 2) to whom a single object is sold, and the valuation
of the object is the same for the both bidders.(v1 = v2 = V ) The value of the object




with the probability of 1
2
2 and if the cost c is paid, the exact value of the object
can be known.3 These settings are common knowledge, the players are not aware
whether the other player has acquired the information, and the condition vh−vl
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> c is
assumed. We’ll analyze and compare bidder’s strategy and equilibrium in two auction
mechanism. (Second price auction, English auction) 4 And lastly the bidding strategy
has researched previous studies, so the focus of this paper is strategy on information
acquisition.
.
2.1 Information Acquisition in Second Price Auction
Second price auction is the auction where each bidder submits a sealed bid and the
bidder with the highest bid obtains the object at a price equal to the second highest bid.
And each bidder decides prior to the auction whether or not to acquire information. I
use a Bayes-Nash Equilibrium concept.
Lemma 1 Neither the state where the both bidders acquire information nor do not
acquire information is an equilibrium.
2Even though it is a simple model, as the number of bidders increases and the distribution of
the value of the auction object gets complicated, it is conjectured that the offsetting force of the two
effects would produce a similar result.
3This can be interpreted as a model in which the two bidders who already possess information
obtain more accurate information, and perfect information can be thought of as the exactly same
information given by a certain information-providing agent preventing the acquisition of different
information.
4In my model, Second price auction can be interpreted as an English auction with rapidly rising
price, so that information cannot be acquired during auction.
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Table 1: payoff matrix
Proof. It can be intuitively understood from the model because it only causes the cost
for the information acquisition, but does not bring any profit. First, this is a two-stage
game where in the first stage, whether they would acquire information is decided and
in the second stage, the bidding is carried out. Since the cost for information in the
first stage is a sunk cost, it does not affect the decision in the second stage, and the
nature of second price auction forces both bidders to bid the true value which brings
both bidders the pay off of −c, so it is not an equilibrium.
The state where the both bidders do not acquire information is also not an equi-
librium. Because when one bidder does not acquire information, the other bidder has
an incentive to acquire information. Let us elaborate this with the following calcula-
tion. First, the bidder without the information would bid
vh + vl
2







) − c once he acquires information. Certainly, this is an
asymmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 1 A mixed strategy that the two bidders acquire information with proba-
bility 1− 4c
vh−vl
is an unique symmetric Nash equilibrium. 5
Proof. See appendix.
5It’s meaning is probability α is decreasing function of cost and increasing function of information’s
value(vh − vl).
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2.2 Information Acquisition in English Auction
The rules of English auction is the following. Since the price increases continuously
from 0 to vh and there are only two bidders, if one drops out, the remaining bidder
obtains the object at the price of at that point of time. Also, we assume the information
is acquired instantly.6
In the English auction, each uninformed bidder may decide to learn his valuation
not only before the auction starts but also during the auction. In other words, in the
English auction, the strategy is to decide whether to acquire the information, at which
point the information should be acquired, and if the information is not to be acquired,
at which point they should drop out. I use a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium concept.
Having thought of the structure in game, the pure strategy of each bidder is the
information acquisition at each stage and the drop point.
Lemma 2 Neither the state where the both bidders acquire information nor do not
acquire information is an equilibrium.
Proof. From the same reasoning of the second price auction, if both bidders acquire
information, they wait until the price reaches the true value and then drop out, so each
of them receives the pay off of −c.




, and based on this strategy, if the other bidder acquires information,







6Since the value is discretely distributed only at two points, price rises discretely in the order of
0 ⇒ vl ⇒
vh + vl
2
⇒ vh, and it can be thought that the information is acquired at each time points
which are assigned to each situation.
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Proposition 2 There is no symmetric equilibrium in the English auction.
Let us see the intuitive reason for this first.7 We divide the price range into three






, vh] respectively, and let the
probability of information acquisition in each interval be α1, α2, α3.
8 Then the informa-
tion acquisition in the interval I3 is a pure strategy which is inferior to the information
acquisition in the interval I1 and I2. Therefore α3 is necessarily 0. Now, neither α1 > 0,
α2 = 0 nor α1 = 0, α2 > 0 can be a symmetric equilibrium. First, the reason that
α1 = 0, α2 > 0 cannot be an equilibrium is simply that when the value is vl , the pay
off from acquiring information in interval I2 is less by −ε than the pay off from acquir-
ing information in interval I1. Finally, the reason that α1 > 0, α2 = 0 cannot be an
equilibrium is that when there is a possibility that a bidder could acquire information
in interval I1, if the other bidder acquires information in interval I2 instead of interval
I1 with a positive probability, he gains −12α1c. It is the key point of this paper that
when the value is low(vl) there exists an incentive to use the information of the other
while observing whether the other player drops out or not.
For a more general comparison, in the case of private value model(Compte model),
the only thing that is to be considered is the degree of competitiveness and the cost.
Therefore there is no incentive to acquire information, and the critical reason that the
revenue of English auction is higher is that the incentives for acquiring information
get larger as it gets less competitive and the probability of winning becomes larger as
time passes. On the contrary, in the common value model, the value of the object is
the same and the information of which is correlated, so in the case of English auction
where the strategies are exposed, there is less incentive for acquiring information.
7See Appendix for the rigorous proof.
8α2 is the probability of an event given that 1 − α1 and α3 is the probability of an event given
that (1− α1)(1− α2).
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Proposition 3 There is an asymmetric equilibrium in the English auction that one
bidder acquires information with probability 1 and drops at real value, while the other
does not acquire information and drop at expected value.
Proof. In addition to assume that each player know that other player can be irrational
player with probability ε. Irrational player is someone who drops at random. This
assumption is required to pin down the equilibrium.
The reasons that this combination of strategies can be an equilibrium are following.
If an uninformed bidder (hereinafter the Bn) participates the English auction with an
informed bidder (hereinafter the Ba), the Bn can ratiocinate that Ba has passed the
point vl may be known by the informed bidder with the information vh or the irregular
player with possibility of ε. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is one in which the bidders
play their best response at each information set given their beliefs about others signals.
Hence, while the expected pay off is 0 when the dropping is made at
vh + vl
2
, 9 if take




. On the contrary, if the opposite side is the Bn, Ba’s the optimal
strategy is absolutely getting information certainly.
9The reason that it does not drop before the point
vh + vl
2
is if the opposite side is irregular, the
expected pay off can be a positive number.
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2.3 Comparing the Revenue.




















one bidder acquires information but the other bidder does not with probability 2α(1−α)






vl. Lastly, if both players does not acquire information with
probability (1− α)2 , revenue is vh + vl
2
.








We can easily see Second price auctions revenue is mixture of English auctions
revenue and a greater value (
vh + vl
2
). So, Second price auction’s revenue is bigger
than English auction.
The reason why I compare Second price auctions revenue at symmetric equilibrium
and English auctions revenue at asymmetric equilibrium is that model settings are
symmetric. This makes the prediction of symmetric equilibrium, if exists, more plau-
sible. But even if the above mention cannot be accepted, Second price auction rule is
not less than English rule in revenue.
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3 Concluding remarks
We have shown that in the common value auction model, when there are two
bidders, what strategies the bidders take in English auction and second price auction,
and how the revenue in second price auction can be higher than the revenue in English
auction.
As much as we see situations to which the private value model can be applicable, we
encounter many situations in real life where the common value model can be applicable.
Including the popular cases like oil-drilling rights auctions, art works that are frequently
mentioned in private value model may also fit for the common value model if we allow
for resale. Through this paper, it is cautiously argued that the superiority of English
auction that has been suggested by previous studies should be reconsidered if we take
into account the acquisition of information(as are the most cases in real life). The
reason is that in an open dynamic model where the information on the value of the
auction object has high correlation, the possibility of inferring the information based on
the strategy and behaviors of the other player decreases the incentive for information
acquisition, which can lead to the decline in revenue.
At last, the additional contribution of this paper is, it has proved that the research
result of if there are two bidders, Second price auction and English auction are perfectly
same does not always true when information acquisition is considered.
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A Appendix
A.1 mathematical analysis of Second price auction
2nd stage(bidding stage) analysis
Bidding strategy of the one who does not acquire information (b1).
Max E[V − b2]1(b1 > b2)
b1 = E[V ] =
vh + vl
2
Bidding strategy of the one who does acquire information (b1).
Max [V − b2]1(b1 > b2)
b1 = V
1st stage (information acquisition stage) analysis
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A.2 mathematical analysis of English auction
proof of proposition 2
I had shown that neither the state where the both bidders acquire information
nor do not acquire information is an equilibrium. Now, I will prove the following
sequence. Assume that there is a symmetric mixed strategy 0 ≤ α1 < 1, 0 ≤ α2 < 1,
0 ≤ α3 < 1(of course one of three must be strictly positive). First, I will show α3
should be 0. Second, α1 also should be 0. Finally proving that α1 = 0, 0 < α2 < 1
cannot be an equilibrium.
First, assume that 0 < α3 < 1. This implied that the bidder, who had not had the
information in the I2 interval, did not drop at the point
vh + vl
2
. This is contradiction.
The explanation of this is that the uninformed bidder will have the negative expected
pay off. If the opposite side is uninformed bidder with the possibility of β, 10 his
expected pay off is (1− β)× 0 + β × [E(v)− P ]1[D1 > D2] < 0. 11 12
Second, I will show α1 should be 0. Lets assume the contrary α1 > 0. α1 is calcu-
lated by (1−α1)(1−α2)× vh−vl4 −c = 0. If bidder 1 is uninformed at I2 then his pay off
matrix is same as Table 1, nothing but belief system. He believes that the other player




















. Therefore if the information acquired









− c. Compare this to the
equation above, the cost is same but the benefit is increased (Due to the fact that the
denominator is smaller than 1). So if the α1 is bigger than 0, the information acqui-
sition will be certainly made in the I2. However, this is not an equilibrium, therefore
the α1 has to be 0.





11Di is a drop point of bidder i.





Lastly, we will prove that α1 = 0, 0 < α2 < 1 cannot be an equilibrium. Given
that 0 < α2 < 1, if bidder acquire information on I1 certainly , his expected pay off is
(1− α2)× vh−vl4 − c. While if he does not acquire information on I1 , his expected pay
off is 1
2
(vl−P ) + (1−α2)× vh−vl4 − c. The term
1
2
(vl−P ) is actually negative ( P > vl
in the interval of I2 ).
13 So if 0 < α2 < 1, then bidders acquire information certainly
at I1. Thus, this is contradiction.
13This term’s meaning is loss when real value is low. Actually it should be multiplied by the
probability of opponent bidder drop early when analyzed more closely. But it is not a zero probability,
so the above logic is true as ever.
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